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CONSENT IN CRIMINAL ASSAULT
By ERNST WILFRED PUTTrKAMMER'
Criminal assault, like rape, is a crime in which the consent of
the prosecutor will remove the criminality of the act.2 It there-
fore becomes necessary to examine what classes of facts will con-
stitute such consent. In the present article the scope of the search
will be still further narrowed, as force or duress, as affecting an
otherwise valid consent will not be taken up. The sole point here
to be considered is as to how far the defendant's assertion that the
prosecutor "consented" may be overthrown by showing that the
prosecutor's failure to make objection was due to ignorance of some
fact or to mistake or to unconsciousness, etc. The question then is,
what is the minimum amount of correct information which the vic-
tim must have in order to enable the defendant successfully to assert
that his act was understandingly allowed? In the following pages the
attempt will be made to ascertain the boundary line below which the
victim's understanding of the true situation is so restricted, either by
ignorance or by erroneous beliefs, that he cannot be said legally to un-
derstand what the defendant is about to do to him, and above which,
on the other hand, he does have just enough correct information
as to defendant's plans so that significance can be attached to his
failure to object. The statement that there was or was not a valid
1. [Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. This article con-
sists of the application to criminal assault cases of the same analysis applied
to rape cases, in an article, "Consent in Rape," printed in the February issue
of this REvmw.]
2. It is, of course, true that the act involved may be so harmful to the
individual concerned, or may be so likely to lead to a breach of the peace that
despite the consent of the alleged victim it will remain a crime. This, how-
ever, is not because the consent is defective or incomplete. It is because the
crime is committed regardless of consent, hence its presence and its con-
stituent elements are immaterial and need not be discussed. It is a presup-
position of the present discussion that the act done is such a one in its
intensity, surrounding circumstances, etc., as might be validly consented to.
[617]
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consent is, then, merely the conclusion that the victim's understand-
ing did or did not rise to this minimum necessary.3
In determining what this necessary minimum of knowledge shall
be legal logic has been only one of several factors. Other factors
are at least as important. That this is true will be made apparent
by looking at several other crimes in which also consent is a defense.
Thus the amount of abhorrence felt for the crime in question would
insensibly exert a powerful influence. Similarly with the severity of
the punishment. So, for instance, in larceny it is obvious that the
excessive mass of refinements involved concerning the taking of pos-
session was a direct reflection of the excessively severe penalties
imposed by contemporary law, on acts which were already felt not to
deserve such a measure of punishment. The particular circum-
stances surrounding each crime would therefore be of great, and
even of paramount, importance in defining the point which the
knowledge of the victim must reach to enable him to give valid con-
sent, and one kind of crime supplies little or no information con-
cerning the solution of the same question in another kind. In fact,
if the limits of minimum knowledge for two separate offenses were
definable in precisely the same way, it would be nothing short of
a remarkable coincidence. Doubtless there might be such a coin-
cidence, but it would be so unlikely as to be practically negligible.
Perhaps the point will be best brought out by a homely instance.
A. and B. are adjoining house-owners and each decides to paint his
house. The houses differ in size, they also differ in the time which
has elapsed since the previous painting. A. and B. have different
views regarding the number of coats necessary. They employ dif-
ferent painters to do the work. No one would, contend that what
was exactly 'sufficient paint' for A. would therefore also be 'suffi-
cient paint' for B. So, too, as to knowledge by the victim, regard-
ing the crime alleged to have been committed on him. What may
be sufficient knowledge to exculpate the defendant in a case involv-
ing capital punishment may by no means be sufficient in another act
involving a slighter punishment. Ordinarily this has been clear
enough to courts and writers. There has been no te.ndency, for
instance, in a rape case to use precedents discussing consent in a
kidnapping case. Nor have kidnapping cases been decided by refer-
3. Much of the preliminary discussion applicable to this analysis in gen-
eral and regardless of whether the crime charged is criminal assault or some
other will be found in the previous article already referred to and will be
omitted here.
CONSENT IN CRIMINAL ASSAULT
ence to rape cases.4 Although in both the discussion is as to what
constitutes 'consent,' it is clearly seen by these courts that this one
word covers concepts which have no bearing on each other and no
relation to each other, just as the meaning of the word 'act' and
the definition given it in homicide have no bearing on the meaning
and definition of 'act' in, let us say, forgery or automobile speeding.
5
Accordingly, when the charge is assault, the minimum knowl-
edge needed to validate the defense can only be ascertained by an
examination of the assault cases and the principles lying back of
them. Although the label 'consent' is the same here and in rape, only
confusion will result from the assumption that therefore the content
of the label is also the same. Yet there has been a particularly
determined effort to show that what was consent in rape must also
be consent in assault. With equal logic it might be held that what
constituted the 'overt act' in rape must also determine what consti-
tutes the 'overt act' in assault. If identity of descriptive word re-
quires identity of substance in one case, it requires it in another
also, and the two crimes would at once coalesce. But, if 'act'
and 'guilty intent' mean one thing for one crime and another thing
for another, then 'consent,' too, may be, and is, a variable term, the
significance of which depends on the crime under discussion. Nor
is this any the less true because many (if not most) of the assaults
raising questions of consent involve situations similar to those in
rape cases. Rather the surface similarity of the problems should
make one more keenly alive to the risk of improperly combining and
confusing inferences and conclusions that belong to one of the two
crimes only. The two most important cases in which just such a
confusion took place are Reg. v. Dee6 and Reg. v. Clarence.
7 So in
4. Cases involving consent secured by fraud, in a charge of kidnapping,
and whose discussion of the significance of such fraud illustrates effectively
their complete indifference to rules laid down for a like investigation in a rape
charge, are: Hadden v. People (1862) 25 N. Y. 373; Beyer v. People (1881)
86 N. Y. 369 (in this case it was held that where the defendant had persuaded
the prosecutrix to come to a certain house in the belief that she was to get
employment as maid in a respectable family, but where the house actually
was a brothel, he had taken her there "against her will") ; People v. De Leon
(1888) 109 N. Y. 226, 16 N. E. 46; Moody v. People (1858) 20 Ill. 319;
Reg. v. Hopkins (1842 N. P.) Carr. & M. 254.
5. Instances will readily occur to the learned reader further illustrating
how completely different concepts may be enclosed in one word. 'A sound
mind' means one thing in judging contractual capacity, another in testamentary
capacity, yet another in criminal capacity. 'Acceptance' has three distinct
meanings in the law of sales. 'Delivery' as used by the conveyancers will
hardly throw light on delivery questions arising from the Statute of Frauds,
etc. •
6. (1884 Ir. Cr. Cas. Res.) 15 Cox C. C. 579.
7. (1888 Cr. Cas. Res.) L. R. 22 Q. B. Div. 23.
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the former case May, C. J., says (at p. 586): "If the consent of
the woman prevented the crime being rape, it would seem that it
would also prevent it being an assault, which consent excludes. '" 7a
Now it may very well be that in any particular situation there would
be valid consent whether it be looked at from the rape angle or the
assault one. We are not yet considering the boundary line of con-
sent in assault. The point here is the fallacy of May's assumption
that a given decision in one necessarily involves a like decision in
the other, or indeed, that it has any bearing whatsoever on the
other.8 In Reg. v. Clarence the defendant was charged in one of
several counts with an assault on his wife "occasioning bodily harm,"
an offense created by a statute then in effect. Therefore in passing
on this count it was necessary to determine whether the facts showed
an assault or not. It appeared that the defendant, being infected
with a venereal disease, had intercourse with his wife, who was not
aware of his condition and would not have permitted his act had
she been aware of it. By his act he infected her, which was the
alleged assault. The case was argued before thirteen of the judges
of the Queen's Bench Division, and has since been uniformly re-
garded as of great authority. By a vote of nine to four it was
decided that the convictions could not be sustained. Of the majority
group the most powerful opinion is that of Wills, J., who commences
by showing that this was not rape and therefrom infers that it was
necessarily also not assault.9 The other majority opinions treat the
present problem in only a cursory way.
On the other hand, a number of English cases have found no
difficulty at all in deciding that different conclusions may be reached
7a. Italics are the present writer's.
8. Palles, C. B., in the same case attempts to create a paradox by saying(p. 590) that a contrary holding would mean that "there may be a consent to
carnal connection (which involves physical contact) consistently with an ab-sence of consent to such physical contact." The answer is that in both casesthere is consent in one sense of the term; that is, the prosecutrix is raising no
objections. To that extent they are alike. But in one crime the cause of thefailure to object is regarded as irrelevant, while in the other the cause is con-
sidered so important that if it is an unsatisfactory one (e. g. the defendant'sfraud), the failure to object has been explained away by the prosecution and
will no longer avail the defendant. Much the same point is made by Murphy,
J., and the same answer applies.
9. Space will not permit a detailed discussion of Wills's argument. In
saying, however, that "There is just as much and just as little consent to onepart of the transaction as to the rest of it," he is going on the same ground
as did Palles, C. B., in Reg. v. Dee (see supra note 8). Here, too, it may be
answered that through her "consent" (viz., her frame of mind) may be the
same, its effectiveness and significance need not be the same for different
purposes.
CONSENT IN CRIMINAL ASSAULT
in the two crimes.10 Thus in Reg. v. Saunders,"' a rape case,
Gurney, B., informed the jury that "the evidence in this case does
not establish the charge contained in this indictment as the crime
was not committed against the will of the prosecutrix, as she con-
sented, believing it to be her husband; but if you think that that
was the case, and that it was a fraud upon her, and that there was
no consent as to this person, you must find the prisoner guilty of an
assault." Again in Reg. v. William, ' 2 there being such consent as
put an end to the rape charge, Alderson, B., directed that the case
proceed as to the assault. So, too, in Reg. v. Bennett,'" where the
charge was indecent assault. These three cases were all prior to
Reg. v. Clarence, but they are directly supported by a case subse-
quent to it, Reg. v. O'Shay,14 where it was said that though it was
no rape yet, "If the prisoner by pretending to be a doctor, induced
the rosecutrix to let him go as far as he did because she thought
he was a doctor, the jury may find him guilty of indecent assault."
Accordingly, since the circumstances giving rise to or destroy-
ing consent in assault may differ from those so operating in rape, it
becomes necessary to examine the question anew for the former
crime, without assumptions carried over from the latter.l4a The
first, and simplest, case is where the prosecutor was unconscious
(from sleep, intoxication, drugs, illness, or any other cause) when
the blow was struck, or was so weak or diseased mentally as to
have no knowledge at all that a blow impended.15 No authorities
will be needed for the proposition that this unconsciousness does not
10. There seems to be very little American authority, but see Nichols v.
State (1883) 72 Ga. 191.
11. (1838 N. P.) 8 Carr. & P. 265.
12. (1838 N. P.) 8 Carr. & P. 286.
13. (1866 N. P.) 4 Fos. & Fin. 1105. Here the prisoner had infected his
niece with venereal disease, under circumstances which, according to Willes,
J., made it impossible to establish rape. Despite her consent to connection,
"if she did not consent to the aggravated circumstances, i. e., to connection
with a diseased man, and a fraud was committed on her, the prisoner's act
would be an assault by reason of such fraud. An assault is within the rule
that fraud vitiates consent . . . and the prisoner would be guilty of
indecent assault."
14. (1898 N. P.) 19 Cox C. C. 76.
14a. No discussion will be attempted (nor would it be pertinent) on what
constitutes an overt act sufficient to amount to a battery. It will be assumed
that the act is sufficient, leaving only the question of consent for decision.
15. Loose statements may be found saying that in such a case the
defendant is "committing a fraud" on the injured person, and that "his act
is an assault by reason of such fraud." (See Reg. v. Bennett, supra note 13.)
Of course, this is a complete misuse of the word fraud. Fraud connotes
thought (though mistaken) by the defrauded person. It has nothing to do
with a complete absence of thought on his part.
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signify the prosecutor's consent to any blow, whose fall he does not
attempt to prevent simply because of his unconsciousness.16
Where the prosecutor is not totally unconscious of the impend-
ing blow, but, on the contrary, is aware that a force is about to be
applied to his body, he may nevertheless be lacking in intelligent
understanding either of the nature of this force and its immediate
effect upon him, or of the consequences directly or indirectly
destined to result from it. In the first case he does not correctly
appreciate the events then occurring about him-it is not the future
situation which these events are to produce that is distorted in his
mind, it is the then present one. In the other case his misconception
relates to just such later results flowing out of the present situation,
and he may correctly appreciate the present situation, except in so
far as his error regarding the future can be called a then-present
error.'
7
The most obvious situation is where the prosecutor expected a
light application of force, for instance, where he believes he sees a
small bamboo cane and agrees to take a blow from it, but where the
force is instead a severe one, the cane being in reality made of steel
in imitation of bamboo. Whether we shall say that he never con-
sented to be struck by a steel rod, or shall put it that he did consent
to be struck by that rod, but was in error regarding the true nature
of the rod, is a choice of words hardly enlightening to a jury and
merely obscures the element of true importance, viz., that the de-
fendant has not overcome the prima facie wrongfulness of his con-
duct by showing an intelligently assenting recipient of his blow.
Whether there never was consent at all to this act, or whether there
was consent to the act due to mistake, is only a question of the
breadth of meaning given to the word 'act,' and cannot be settled
on a priori grounds based simply on reasoning from the word 'con-
sent.' Closely connected with the example just used is the case
where defendant is given a full and intelligent permission to apply
16. An exception to the foregoing must be made in favor of the surgeon
who is forced to make an emergency operation on an unconscious patient. Itmight be argued that there is a reasonable inference of 'implied' consent here,because the patient would have consented expressly had he been conscious.But the fact remains that, whatever the cause, he did not give any assent, and
was simply a blank mentally, which is not in general sufficient to give pro-tection to the defendant. Hence it seems better to put the surgeon's exemp-tion from criminal pursuit frankly on the obvious desirability of encouraging,
and not discouraging, conduct of this kind.
17. Whether on closer examination a real difference will be found be-tween these various groups, or whether they will be found to merge byimperceptible degrees, will be left uncertain for the moment. There is, how-
ever, some convenience in grouping the cases in this manner for the purpose
of discussion, and in taking them up in succession.
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one kind of force, and under cover of this and without informing
the victim he adds another force to the one assented to. There is
no understanding of the new force, and hence no approval of it.
The leading case is Commonwealth v. Stratton," where the defend-
ant was shown to have placed a quantity of harmful powder on
some figs, which he then offered to the prosecutrix. Not knowing
of the powder, she ate the figs, and became seriously ill. The court
did not attempt to decide whether she should be said to have assented
only to a wholesome fig, or whether she assented to that specific
object, although solely under the erroneous idea that it was nothing
more than a wholesome fig. In the one view there would be no
consent, in the other an invalid one, being based on a mistake. In
neither is there the necessary intelligent assent.19 Exactly the same
reasoning applies where the defendant, while suffering from a
venereal disease, has sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by her
permission (but without her knowing of the disease), and so infects
her. She has assented to the exercise of certain physical forces,
viz., those forming a part of the sexual act. If she is ignorant of
the diseased condition of the defendant, she has not assented to the
18. (1873) 114 Mass. 303. In accord on same facts, State v. Monroe
(1897) 121 N. C. 677, 28 S. E. 547.
19. This is the view which at the start also prevailed in England. The
first authority available is Rex v. Treeve (1796 Cr. Cas. Res.) 2 East P. C.
821. The defendant was indicted for that he "maliciously did provide . . .
bread to be eaten as food by French prisoners of war," such bread "being
made of and containing dirt, filth, and other ingredients not fit to be eaten."
He was held guilty. It will be noticed that the offense was not denominated
an assault in so many words and indeed seems rather to have been looked at,
from the special circumstances, as an offense against the king. Almost
identical charges were made in Rex v. Dixon (1814 K. B.) 3 Maule & Sel. 11,
though this time the victims were the inmates of an orphan asylum. Using
the foregoing case as a precedent, the same result was reached. In Reg. v.
Button (1838 Cent. Crim. Ct.) 8 Carr. & P. 660, however, a common-law
assault was specifically charged. The facts were to all intents and purposes
as in Commonwealth- v. Stratton, the defendant having placed a drug in the
prosecutrix's coffee. His counsel evidently considered the consent argument
hopeless, and contented himself with a vain attempt to show that an infliction
of poison did not constitute the kind of overt act necessary to ground an
assault charge on, a contention not in point in this paper. The jury were
charged to the opposite effect, however, and the prisoner was held guilty.
This apparently common sense result was first attacked in Reg. v. Dilworth
(1843 N. P.) 2 Moody & Rob. 531," where Coltman, J., in a dictum not called
for by the case before him, expressed his disagreement with Reg. v. Button,
but gave no reason therefor. A decision on the exact lines of Coltman's
dictum came two years later, in Reg. v. Walkden (1845 N. P.) 1 Cox C. C.
282, but again no reason for rejecting Button's case was given, Parke, B.,
merely saying that it "could not be supported." Apparently, however, this
simply overrules it on the question whether the giving of poison was the
requisite overt act, not on the issue of the presence or absence of consent.
Finally such an act was held, without opinion, to be no assault at common
law in Reg. v. Hanson (1849 N. P.) 4 Cox C. C. 138. The overruling of
Reg. v. Button is criticized in Commonwealth v. Stratton (p. 306).
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other and wholly distinct forces thereby exerted on her. With
regard to them her mind is a blank, a state of affairs completely
constructive of the defendant's excuse of consent.20 Most of the
cases dealing with the point have been civil suits in which the in-jured woman sought to recover damages,2 criminal prosecutions
being comparatively rare. Apparently it has not yet been passed on
by the highest court of any American state,2 2 although three cases
have dealt with it in England. The first was Reg. v. Bennett,2
where Willes, J., instructed the jury that if the facts as charged
were made out an assault would be shown. This instruction was
approved and followed in Reg. v. Sinclair.24 But in Reg. v. Clar-
ence2 5 these cases were overruled and the contrary result reached.
The majority of the court was obviously led astray by the erroneous
notion that they were bound by a line of rape cases. As was morejustly appreciated by Hawkins, J.,26 the charge has nothing to do
20. The majority of the court in Reg. v. Clarence (infra note 25) aregroundlessly troubled with the fear that a holding as urged in this article
would necessarily render a man criminally responsible even when the womaninfected by him was a mere professional prostitute. Without discussing
whether or not such a result would be clearly undesirable, it suffices to saythat it is by no means an unavoidable consequence. The professional prosti-tute plies her trade under circumstances where the element of disease is ex-
tremely likely to be present, as she is well aware. As a result her ac-quiescence in the performance of the act almost inevitably leads to the infer-
ence that she was in fact aware of the risk of contracting disease. In other
words, in measuring the extent of her understanding of what was going on
or probably going on, we find that it includes far more than would be infer-
rible in the case of the chaste woman. Cases will be referred to later where
the victims were children and where in consequence the scope of their intelli-gent assent was narrowed. If for them it should be narrowed because of
their limited understanding, it is equally proper to broaden it, when dealing
with a case of unusually wide understanding. In short, the very fact of the
victim's being a prostitute would go far to answer the state's contention that
she was not aware of the risk of contracting a disease.
21. The leading case is Hegarty v. Shine (1878 Ir. C. A.) 14 Cox C. C.
145.
22. A well-considered nisi prius case from Delaware directly supportsthe views expressed in the test: State v. Lankford (1917) 29 Del. 594, 102Atl. 63. See also State v. Marcks (1897) 140 Mo. 656, 43 S. W. 1095, a case
not directly in point, the charge being rape, and the diseased condition of the
woman being merely shown to establish the fact of connection. Referringto the possibility of an assault charge, Sherwood, J., says, in a dictum (p. 677,43 S. W. at p. 1097) : "If he [the defendant] was aware at the time of theillicit connection . . . that he was infected with the venereal disease, her
consent to the sexual act would be abrogated by the fraud practiced on her,
and would consequently constitute the sexual act an assault." This statementis misleading in one respect, however. The sexual act itself, being understoodby her, is not and cannot become an assault. The assault lies in inflicting thedisease, regarding which there never was any thought by her.
23. Supra note 13.
24. (1867 N. P.) 13 Cox C. C. 28.
25. L. R. 22 Q. B. Div. 23. This case has already been commented on
at length.
26. L. R. 22 Q. B. Div. at p. 52.
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with the sexual act as such. It is a mere coincidence of no impor-
tance whatsoever that the poison inflicted was transmitted in the
doing of such an act. For the present purpose the identical problem
would be raised had the poison been transmitted, let us say, by in-
fecting one's glove with lockjaw and then shaking hands with a
person who had an open wound in his hand. Yet it is almost an
irresistible inference that in the assumed case some, at least, of the
majority judges would have gone over to the dissent. While Reg.
v. Clarence doubtless represents the present state of the law in Eng-
land, it is submitted that the view of the earlier English cases and
of what American authority there is, is the better reasoned.2 7
A slightly more difficult situation arises where the prosecutor is
not put in contact with any additional or greater force than the one
contemplated by him, but where there is (unknown to him) a sub-
stitution of force A, which he has knowledge of, by force B, which
he does not know about, the two being alike in their effect on his
body. An instance of this appears in Reg. v. Case,28 where the de-
fendant, according to the interpretation put on the facts by the
court, took indecent liberties with the person of the prosecutrix
after persuading her that he was treating her surgically with medical
instruments. Apparently she expected his instruments to manipulate
her in just the manner in which his hands did.29 It would seem
that the line might well have been drawn here, on the ground that
she did know the full amount of force that was to be applied on
her, and that the means by which it was applied, the purpose of the
doer, and the consequences to her were all merely collateral. In
other words, just as in rape the central fact which must be known
is the sexual act, so here it is the amount of the force being brought
to bear. It was, however, ruled otherwise, it being said that "what
she consented to was something wholly different from what was
done, and, therefore, what was done, was done without her consent."
In support of the case it can of course be urged, and perhaps rightly,
that it was only a coincidence that the two forces were equal, and
that there was no consent to any other act than medical treatment,
even though the thing done happened to be the same in its effect on
her. Next in order is the question, will her knowledge still be
insufficient even if she correctly understands the nature of the force
and the manner of its application, but is in error regarding the per-
27. This is also Bishop's opinion. See Bishop "Criminal Law" (9th ed.
1923) II sec. 72 b (2).
28. (1850 Crim. App.) 4 Cox C. C. 220.
29. A parallel case is Nichols v. State, supra note 10, if we accept the
woman's evidence as true.
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sonal identity of the doer? Even here it has been twice held that
the act thereby remains an assault.80 In both instances, however,
the facts showed her assent to sexual connection because of her
belief that the doer was her husband, hence the matter of his identity
was obviously of unusual importance. Certainly it would not be
safe to infer from them that in general error as to the actor is enough
to "vitiate consent."
So far discussion has been limited to cases of ignorance as to
the then existing circumstances and happenings. But the victim
may be uninformed or incorrectly informed regarding the conse-
quences which will at a future time occur to him as a result of the
act in question, or regarding the purpose with which the defendant
does the act.3 In both of these situations there is authority that
the defense is ineffective.
The only direct adjudications dealing with error as to conse-
quences are respectively an English and a Wisconsin case, Rex. v.
Rosinski 2 and Bartell v. State,33 the facts being practically the same
in both. The defendant, a quack healer, persuaded the prosecutrix
that certain indecent conduct was necessary as a means toward
curing her ailment. Knowing what he was doing but deceived by
him as to its effects, she raised no objection to his conduct. In both
it was held to be an assault, though with almost no discussion on
this point by the court. Ignorance or error, not as to consequences,
but as to the purpose actuating the defendant, has come before the
courts slightly more frequently. Thus in Reg. v. Lock34 the de-
fendant had committed indecent acts on two very young boys, who
had no conception of the meaning of his conduct or his reason for
doing so. The judges in a series of brief but forceful opinions point
out the difference between a bare submission induced by ignorance
on the one hand and, on the other, consent, by which it is plain
from the context that they mean an understanding acquiescence.
While they refer to the boys' ignorance of the nature of the act,
they actually have in mind their ignorance of the prisoner's evil
purpose, as there is no evidence that more, different, acts occurred
here than they knew of. Error regarding the purpose of the de-
30. Reg. v. Samnders (11838 N. P.) 8 Carr. & P. 265, and Reg. v. Wil-
liouns (1838 N. P.) 8 Carr. & P. 286.
31. Purpose is used as synonymous with motive, as the latter is defined
by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook in "Act, Intention and Motive" (1917)
Yale Law Journal XXVI 645. 661.
32. (1824, Cr. Cas. Res.) 1 Moody 19.
33. (1900) 106 Wis. 342, 82 N. W. 142.
34. (1872 Crim. App.) 12 Cox C. C. 244.
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fendant was involved in State v. Nash,35 where according to the
state's version the prosecutrix believed that the prisoner's actions
were done with a purpose of medical diagnosis. It is apparent that
had this version of the facts been accepted it would have been held
an assault.38 In thus making the criminality hinge on the proper or
improper purpose or motive of the defendant these courts are not
without supporting authority.3 7 None the less, it would seem a
dangerous doctrine, and certainly a difficult one to limit. Indeed,
when once it has been held that fraud or ignorance will still operate
to destroy consent even when the force to be applied to the prose-
cutor is known and is not exceeded, and the fraud of ignorance
extends only to collateral circumstances, it inevitably becomes diffi-
cult or impossible to fix on any subsequent logical stopping place.
Perhaps it is significant, however, that in all these cases involving
misconception of collateral circumstances, the prosecutor was inno-
cent, in the sense either of not knowing of the defendant's evil pur-
pose or of believing in facts which had they been true would have
made the conduct of both parties morally and legally proper. Thus
they. do not necessarily stand for the proposition that fraud as to
consequences or result will always vitiate consent. It is apparently
only when the fraud operates against an innocent and guiltless per-
son that the law regards it as serious enough to overthrow the de
facto consent. If the fraud is practiced on one who is thereby neces-
sarily shown to be morally at fault himself, probably the resulting
defect in consent will not injure the defendant.3 8 No cases can be
found so limiting it, but it is submitted that this is the farthest
extent to which we can push the cases.
To sum up, it would appear to be a fair statement that the law
here is not directly interested in actual consent. It concerns itself
rather with an inquiry into the state of knowledge of the victim,
and judges the defendant atcordingly. If the knowledge is insuffi-
35. (1891) 109 N. C. 824, 13 S. E. 874.
36. The same may be said as to Nichols v. State, supra note 10, accord-
ing to the facts as put in paragraph one of the headnote opinion.
37. Space will not permit any discussion hereof. For a direct holding
that a wrongful motive may render an act otherwise innocent a guilty one,
see Young v. Conwwnwealth (1907) 126 Ky. 474, 104 S. W. 266. There is
also a brief but forceful discussion by Professor Cook in his article cited,
supra note 31, at p. 661, together with a reference to a number of cases. To
these should be added State v. Beck (1833 S. C. Law) 1 -ill 363 (dictum
only).
38. This limitation will meet the difficulty often raised by counsel,
arguendo, that we must now hold it an assault if a man secures a woman's
consent to intercourse on the promise that he will give her a large sum of
money, but not meaning to keep the promise. Not at all. The facts, even if
true, would show a prosecutrix not morally blameless, but quite the contrary,
and so not within the cases just discussed.
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cient or is distorted by misinformation, the defense fails, however
enthusiastically and willingly the victim may have approved under
the facts as he saw them.89 Thus there are in effect simply two
distinct ways for the state to overcome the issue of consent, either
by showing a mind which did not act at all on the matter as to which
it is alleged to have chosen, or a mind which acted in circumstances
indicating that no choice was made on the situation really involved.
In both the end is the same, the explaining and thereby the over-
coming of the alleged consent by which the defendant is trying to
excuse himself.40
39. This statement probably epitomizes the difference between the views
urged in the present paper and those advanced in Professor Beale's widelyknown article on "Consent in the Criminal Law" (1895) Harv. L. Rev. VIII317. Space is not available for a detailed comparison of the two, nor is there
any need of it, as the divergent viewpoints are sufficiently apparent in thetexts themselves. Such a detailed criticism may, however, be found in 29 Ir.
L. T. 427.
40. In conclusion the writer wishes to forestall one objection which
might be raised, viz., that by this analysis of consent it would be possible topunish a person who in the best of faith believed that he was dealing with a
consenting party, and who was completely taken by surprise by a later dis-
covery that the consent was not valid. Thus, for example, Wills, J., in Reg.
v. Clarence, supra note 7, at p. 32, says, "If the conviction be upheld on theground of the difference between the thing consented to and the thing done,
: . . knowledge of his or her condition on the part of the person affectedis immaterial." The answer, as is indicated by Field, J., in the same case(see also State v. Lankford, supra note 22) is that where the defendant is
acting under a mistake of fact (of such a kind as is deemed sufficient by thelaw) he is always to be treated, so far as the criminal law is concerned, asif the facts really were as he believed them to be. What constitutes a suffi-
cient mistake, whether it must be entertained both honestly and reasonably, or
whether it need merely be the former, does not concern us here. (Typicaldecisions holding that it must be both honest and reasonable are: Chambless
v. State (1904) 46 Tex. Cr. 1, 79 S. W. 577; McQuirk v. State (188) 84 Ala.435, 4 So. 775; Beaven v. Commonwealth (1895 Ky.) 30 S. W. 968; that it
need merely be honest: Bartell v. State, supra note 33; Rex v. Roshnski, supra
note 32; State v. Warren (1911) 232 Mo. 185, 134 S. W. 522. If, therefore,he believes on grounds regarded as adequate that he is dealing with a con-
senting person, he will be treated as if this were so by the operation of a
rule in no way specially devised for this situation, but extending all through
the field of criminal law and applicable generally in cases of mistake of fact.Where the victim's error is due to the fraud of the defendant himself, goodfaith on the latter's part would seem to be necessarily excluded. Where, on
the other hand, it is a case of ignorance by the victim, it may very well bethat the defendant escapes. In this respect, and in this only, it is submitted,there is a possible difference of result between the case of absence of thoughtby the victim and that of his mistaken thought.
